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Key Points 
The extent to which athletic pacing is under conscious or subconscious control has 
been a significant point of discussion and disagreement among researchers in this field, 
yet has failed to produce notable advances in our understanding of pacing mechanisms. 
 
The notion that conscious processes are independent of subconscious, pre-conscious 
and unconscious influence is conceptually flawed, restricted in theoretical scope and 
has limited investigative utility. 
 
Key terms of conscious, preconscious, subconscious and unconscious are defined and 
dual process theory, which distinguishes between intuitive and deliberative action, is 
offered as an alternative framework for investigating the control of athletic pacing. 
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Abstract 
A prevailing issue is the extent to which athletic pacing decisions are made consciously 
or subconsciously. In this article we discuss why the one-dimensional conscious-
subconscious debate that has reigned in the pacing literature has suppressed our 
understanding of the multidimensional processes that occur in pacing decisions: how do 
we make our decisions in real life competitive situations? What information do we use 
and how do we respond to opponents? These are questions that need to be explored 
and better understood, using smartly designed experiments. The paper provides clarity 
about key conscious, pre-conscious, subconscious and unconscious concepts, terms 
that have previously been used in conflicting and confusing ways. The potential of dual 
process theory, in articulating multidimensional aspects of intuitive and deliberative 
decision-making processes, is discussed in the context of athletic pacing along with 
associated process-tracing research methods. In attempting to refine pacing models 
and improve training strategies and psychological skills for athletes, the dual-process 
framework could be used to gain a clearer understanding of i) the situational conditions 
for which either intuitive or deliberative decisions are optimal, ii) how intuitive and 
deliberative decisions are biased by things like perception, emotion and experience, and 
iii) the underlying cognitive mechanisms such as memory, attention allocation, problem-
solving and hypothetical thought.  
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1. Introduction 
Athletic pacing has been defined as the way power output, work or energy expenditure 
is controlled or distributed to complete an event in the fastest possible time, having 
utilized all available resources [1,2]. One of the most common questions encountered at 
pacing symposia is whether regulatory mechanisms during self-paced exercise operate 
at a conscious or subconscious level. Indeed this question has been the focus of much 
of the pacing literature, including the influential central governor theory [3-8]. Although 
conscious perceptual processes are a recognised component of this theory [7,8], its 
main tenet is that a central controller subconsciously regulates the recruitment of motor 
units during exercise, acting as a protective homeostatic system that responds to 
afferent feedback about internal physiological disturbances [3-8]. A predominant 
alternative view is the psychobiological model [9] which contends motor unit recruitment 
is a consciously regulated process, as evidenced by the negative effects that 
distracting, loading or fatiguing the conscious mind have on pacing [10,11]. Not 
surprisingly, perceived exertion plays a central role, and constitutes the main conscious 
component of these [6,9] and other pacing models [8,12-14]. Hence, the key point of 
disagreement between the models is not the inclusion of conscious processes, but 
rather the extent to which such processes are responsible for muscle recruitment and 
pacing behaviour.  
Although perception of effort is a feature of central governor theory [5,15], it is the 
existence and operation of a subconscious controller in the brain that is regarded to 
regulate muscle recruitment [5]. Importantly, the theory does not describe the existence 
of an anatomically distinct central governor structure in the brain, and our interpretation 
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is that central governance refers to a functional property of the central nervous system, 
which likely involves interactions between various brain structures and neurological 
networks. In contrast, the psychobiological model argues that pacing behaviour is 
exclusively under conscious control and so a subconscious controller is not needed 
[9,10]. Edwards and Polman have proposed an explanation that involves both 
conscious and subconscious mechanisms [16]. They suggest that, while minor 
homeostatic pacing modifications operate at a subconscious level, major threats to 
homeostasis lead to conscious awareness and a deliberate behavioural pacing 
response [16]. Although this explanation is plausible, it still remains narrowly focused on 
the issue of consciousness as a determinant of pacing behaviour. We also feel that, at 
present, there are competing and incongruent perspectives about the relative roles of 
conscious and subconscious processing in pacing and that simplistic definitions of these 
concepts are used in the various pacing models.  
This conscious-subconscious pacing quagmire is clearly an intellectually engaging 
debate, yet attempts to resolve it have not furthered our understanding of pacing 
mechanisms or how exercise intensity is regulated across an exercise bout. This should 
not imply that the consideration of consciousness and other related philosophical, 
psychological and psychoanalytical fields in sports science would not be efficacious. In 
fact, advances in these complex topics constitute some of the most important and 
exciting developments in contemporary science [17-19]. Our assertion is that the 
predominant dichotomy wherein either conscious or subconscious mechanisms govern 
pacing is both conceptually flawed and unlikely to yield significant gains in our 
understanding of how pace is regulated during exercise. Consequently, the conscious-
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subconscious question will be reframed into one of dual-processes, which we believe 
provides greater investigative utility in elucidating pacing mechanisms. We would also 
like to point out that exploring the conscious-subconscious paradigm is only one facet of 
the multidimensional process of decision-making in the context of regulating exercise 
intensity. An overly strong focus on only this leaves other exciting and useful areas of 
exploring human behaviour in sports context relatively unattended. For example, 
athlete-environment interactions as described in a recent review [20], are a crucial 
factor in understanding the regulation of exercise intensity. In this review, a framework 
is proposed based on ecological psychology and the interdependence of perception and 
action. This framework allows us to incorporate, understand and explore athletic 
behaviour in more complex pacing situations, such as how athletes respond to actions 
of their opponents. With dual-processes theory, we can also provide a broader 
framework capable of incorporating processes of decision-making, pacing and 
performance in more complex, real life competitive situations. It is our contention that 
conceptualizing decision making in pacing as involving intuitive or deliberative process 
provides a means through which progress can be made on parallel problems without 
getting ‘stuck’ on the singular issue of conscious versus subconscious control. In 
addition to the opportunities for exploring the multidimensional character of pacing, such 
an approach reflects the complex nature of athletic decision-making. We begin by 
clarifying fundamental conscious, subconscious, preconscious and unconscious 
concepts. 
2. The Conscious, Subconscious, Preconscious and Unconscious 
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In some of the pacing literature, mechanisms are commonly discussed as being under 
either conscious or subconscious control [7,9]. For several reasons, this is a false 
dichotomy. The terms subconscious and unconscious have unfortunately been used 
synonymously [21-24] but they are distinct, and the distinction has a particular 
relevance to the issue of pacing.  
The subconscious relates to mental processes operating outside consciousness, such 
as habitual or instinctive action. This is clearly an important factor in athletic pacing, but 
it needs to be differentiated from the unconscious by which is meant the dynamic 
unconscious of psychoanalytic theory. This will be explored below. According to the 
Freudian topographical model, there is also the preconscious, which is the location for 
those mental representations and processes of which you are unaware in the present 
but could be aware of if your attention was drawn towards them, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily [25]. During exercise an athlete might be unaware of certain actions like 
pedaling or stride length, or physiological functions like respiration unless their attention 
is shifted towards them at which point conscious awareness would occur. 
In contrast to the subconscious and the preconscious, the unconscious mind contains 
phantasies, memories and thoughts that an individual is unaware of and cannot readily 
access by redirecting their attention. The concept of the unconscious is firmly rooted in 
traditional psychoanalytic theory [25] and, while it has undergone considerable 
theoretical evolution [26-29], there are several principles that all perspectives share in 
common. The first is that the unconscious mind contains all mental representations and 
processes that, by definition, an individual is not aware of. The second is that the 
unconscious mind operates in a dynamic way, influencing our conscious experience, 
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feelings, personality and behaviour. As such, rather than being distinct, a transactional 
relationship exists between the unconscious and conscious mind.  
Autonomic physiological processes like the cardiac cycle or perspiration operate at a 
subconscious level, as do perhaps elements of what have previous been described as 
pacing templates or schemas [30]. They are unconscious in that they are outside 
awareness but more usefully described as subconscious, so as to differentiate them 
from the psychoanalytic dynamic unconscious.  By this is meant aspects of lived 
experience that individuals find traumatic, overly conflicted or otherwise difficult to cope 
with. Freud referred to repression as the mechanism by which these were placed in and 
kept in the unconscious rather than reaching our awareness [25]. For an athlete, this 
could include difficult experiences or perceptions that they experience during a race. It 
could also include unconscious conflicts about succeeding or failing, or other emotional 
conflicts that are impeding the optimum capacity to function at this particular moment or 
indeed driving one further to win. In this sense, repression is a defence mechanism that 
protects the conscious self from experiencing disturbing or threatening thoughts. While 
it could be argued that repression potentially benefits performance by regulating 
negative thoughts, feelings and anxieties, it might also limit performance by inhibiting 
and interfering with conscious drives and motivations. Whether debilitative or facilitative, 
psychoanalytic theory predicts that it is the dynamic relationship between unconscious 
and conscious mind that influences all behavior including athletic pacing. 
It is important to point out that the term unconscious in this context is not referring to a 
sleeping state although sometimes, through dreaming, elements of the unconscious 
mind can move into conscious awareness. In this model the experience of not being 
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able to remember a dream occurs because the meaning of the dream moves back into 
the unconscious mind. Psychoanalysts and psychodynamic psychotherapists often use 
methods like free association to bring aspects of the unconscious mind to conscious 
awareness. Hypnosis, which Freud experimented with but then later abandoned, is 
another technique for gaining access to the unconscious. Interestingly, it has been 
found that changes to perceived exertion, cardiovascular activity and cerebral blood 
flow during cycling can be elicited using hypnotic manipulation [31-33] suggesting an 
unconscious influence on how individuals consciously experience exercise and further 
indicating that conscious experiences are only a relatively small part of what governs 
our decisions and reactions. 
The conscious mind contains those thoughts that a person is aware of in the present. In 
the context of exercise this would include perceived exertion, perceived fatigue, pain 
and other sensory-perceptual experiences. The consciousness of perception remains a 
highly debated issue [34] although in the context of regulation of pace it has been 
suggested that a continuum of conscious control exists from not aware to fully aware 
[16]. It would also include affective feeling states such as moods and emotions. A range 
of complex higher-order cognitive skills relevant to athletic pacing also proceed through 
conscious thought such as problem-solving, mental rehearsal, mental simulation, logical 
reasoning and language-dependent strategies such as self-talk [35].  
The conscious, preconscious and unconscious are not independent of each other and 
this has implications for the conscious-subconscious pacing debate.  The conscious is a 
subset of the preconscious that is, in turn, a subset of the unconscious. Thus every 
thought, perception and decision an athlete feels they have experienced or made 
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consciously, has unconscious origins [28,29]. The question of whether pace is under 
conscious or subconscious control is therefore flawed because it implies one is distinct 
or separate from the other (see Figure 1a), rather than the conscious being a subset of 
the unconscious (see Figure 1b). Furthermore, during a race athletes are known to shift 
their attention between external and internal sensations [36,37] as well as between 
associative and dissociative thoughts [35,38]. Redirecting attention during an event in 
this way is indicative of the dynamic interrelationship between the unconscious, 
preconscious and conscious mind. The predictable, trait-like pacing behaviours that 
have recently been demonstrated [39] perhaps have their roots in the unconscious 
origins of personality [40]. 
Even if it would be possible to definitively establish which aspects of pace regulation an 
athlete was consciously aware of, which aspects shifted between preconscious and 
conscious, and which aspects an athlete was not aware of (unconscious), it is unlikely 
that such knowledge would advance our understanding of underlying mechanisms. For 
instance, establishing that a decision to increase speed was made consciously would 
reveal nothing about the information processing and cognitive processes that led to that 
outcome. Similarly, showing that some changes in speed are made without the athlete 
being consciously aware of them, also tells us very little about the processes behind 
regulation of pace and how athletes select pace. In this sense the prevailing issue of 
whether pacing control is conscious or subconscious, which may have developed from 
earlier peripheral versus central control discussions [3,15], is rather one-dimensional 
and therefore of limited investigative utility.     
3. Dual-Processes: An Effective Alternative 
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We propose the traditional debate about pacing in terms of either conscious or 
subconscious regulation should be reframed in terms of intuitive or deliberative control 
mechanisms. Although there is some overlap with conscious-subconscious, examining 
intuitive and deliberative processes introduces new questions regarding the potential 
influence of dual cognitive processes of pacing behavior likely to enhance our 
understanding of the phenomenon.  
The origins of dual processes in judgment and decision-making arose from several 
academic fields of study including economic decision theory [41-48], social judgment 
theory [49,50] and cognitive psychology [51-57]. The fundamental principle that 
underpins dual process theory is that, contrary to previous beliefs, individuals are not 
always fully rational when making decisions. Furthermore, decisions are often subject to 
a variety of influences including emotional state, previous experience, perception and 
social context. This perspective is consistent with findings from two recent reviews of 
pacing [20,21] in which the complexities of making pacing decisions were highlighted, 
particularly in regard to processing a wide array of situational cues and sensory-
perceptual information. The present manuscript adopts a contemporary psychological 
perspective of decision-making in pacing, which is very accommodating of athlete-
environment interactions. 
The interdisciplinary literature on dual process control has revealed several consistent 
distinctions between intuitive and deliberative thought. Intuition is automatic and does 
not use working memory resources [57]. Consequently it involves very little cognitive 
effort, is quick, powerful and facilitates parallel functions [58,59]. Intuition is also 
associative and practical, meaning that complex tasks, problems and uncertain 
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situations can be tackled by drawing on previous experience and beliefs [56,60]. 
Intuition is not associated with general intelligence [61]. In contrast, deliberation involves 
conscious language-related reflection [62] that draws heavily on working memory 
resources [63,64] and is linked with general intelligence [61,65]. It is slow, sequential 
and requires much cognitive effort [66-68]. Deliberative thinking does however permit 
abstract and hypothetical thinking. 
4. Heuristics and Biases 
Dual process theory also provides a framework around which research studies can be 
designed to gain a better understanding of the cognitive mechanisms of pacing and in 
this regard heuristics and biases are two useful concepts. A heuristic is a cognitive 
shortcut that enables people to make decisions, often quickly, in situations where there 
are large amounts of complex, confusing and competing sources of information that 
would be impossible to process. In other words, people reduce complex scenarios into 
simpler decision-making propositions by ignoring some of the information available to 
them, and this can proceed either through intuitive or deliberative means [45]. Until the 
mid 1970s it was assumed that people are rational decision-makers but in work that 
eventually earned them the 2002 Nobel Prize for Economic Science, Tversky and 
Kahneman showed that most decision-making errors can be attributed to heuristic 
influences that have an irrational basis [45]. In dual process theory, decision-making 
errors that are highly predictable are referred to as biases.  
In the context of pacing, it would be impossible for an athlete to consider all of the 
possible factors and potential outcomes of taking certain actions therefore we propose 
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that heuristic principles enable athletes to make pacing decisions in uncertain 
conditions. This is particularly relevant to early pacing decisions that are made during 
endurance activity at a point where a great deal of uncertainty exists about how external 
factors might change or how the athlete’s physical condition will develop. The concept 
of heuristics is also far less deterministic than previous models [6,8,9,12-14] that have 
suggested the universal driver of pacing behavior is perceived exertion. Dual process 
theory is less rigid, accommodating the possibility that perceived exertion might be just 
one of many other heuristic influences that athletes could utilize in making pacing 
decisions. This is consistent with a view put forward by Gigerenzer and colleagues [69] 
that heuristics are used in an adaptive way with individuals selecting heuristics 
according to the perceived demands of a situation or problem. Evidence also suggests 
that athletes are similarly adaptive in how they make decisions. For example, it has 
been shown that conditioned beliefs about performance strongly influence early pacing 
behavior despite unsustainably high levels of perceived exertion [70] suggesting that in 
some circumstances the self-belief heuristic might have a stronger influence on 
decisions than the perceived exertion heuristic. In a number of other studies, the actions 
of a competitor have been strongly associated with pace change [71-73] perhaps 
indicating that, in some situations, it might be strategically advantageous to act in ways 
that would otherwise be contraindicated by the corresponding perceived exertion 
trajectory.  
We are not suggesting that perceived exertion is not an important heuristic in pacing but 
rather, as part of an adaptive system, athletes have other heuristic principles that they 
might draw on in making pacing decisions. The affect heuristic [45], whereby a person’s 
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present emotional state influences their decisions, is one of the most common and 
powerful heuristics known and, as some research has indicated has a relevance to 
pacing [74]. As previously noted, perceived exertion shares many characteristics of an 
emotion [15] and in this regard may act similarly to the affect heuristic in the 
determination of pace as many of the models predict [6,8,9,12-14]. However, 
sometimes perceived exertion models of pacing are unable to account for failures in 
performance resulting from poor pacing which, for example in the central governor 
model should be prevented through homeostatic control [3-6], or in perceived exertion 
trajectory models [8, 12-14] would result in preventative pacing adjustments. It is 
through the availability of other heuristics, and athletes’ ability to use them in adaptive 
ways, that it becomes conceptually possible to account for both successful and 
unsuccessful pacing outcomes on both an intra-individual and inter-individual basis. 
Specifically, the availability of other heuristics means that pacing successes and pacing 
errors can be explained in terms of the situational appropriateness of heuristic selection 
and utilization, or attributed to cognitive biases or dysfunctional cognitive shortcuts that 
have driven the decision.  Dual process theory can also account for the interesting 
suggestion that different individuals adopt different decision-making strategies, 
according to the particular heuristics they prefer. In summary, dual process theory is 
much more flexible and accommodating of varied pacing behavior than previous 
perceived exertion centric models. 
5. Pacing as a multidimensional process 
Returning to the conscious-subconscious discussion, a further point we would like to 
make is that pacing is a multidimensional process. If we limit ourselves to only one facet 
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of this multidimensional process, the conscious versus subconscious control issue, 
other exciting and useful areas of exploring human behaviour in sports context will 
remain relatively unattended. Therefore, as proposed in several recent reviews [20,21], 
we argue for a broader focus aimed at exploring how decisions are made in real life 
competitive situations and what information is used to inform such decisions. It has 
been demonstrated that opponents in ‘real world’ athletic competitions appear to 
influence athletic decision-making and tactics [75,76], supporting the interdependence 
of perception and action as advocated by the ecological perspective [20]. Action 
possibilities are afforded by the environment, and the perception of these action 
possibilities will be affected by the action capacity of the exerciser. This allows us to 
explain and further investigate human-environment interactions, such as racing against 
opponents, as well as analysing in-competition behaviour exploring new facets of 
pacing not possible with existing models. In addition, it is important to explore what 
other factors influence pacing and decision-making. There are indications that cognitive 
performance and potentially decision-making ability are compromised when individuals 
become physically fatigued [77], or as a consequence of low self-efficacy [78] or high 
anxiety [79]. The effects of physical fatigue on decision-making are clearly very relevant 
for occupations such as the military and emergency services where physical capacity 
and decision-making ability are crucial for optimal performance. An overly strong focus 
on the conscious-subconscious paradigm neglects the multiplicity of factors relevant to 
athletic decision-making that might be accommodated better with dual process theory. 
6. Implications for Pacing Research 
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Dual process theory and the distinctions between intuitive and deliberative cognitive 
processes outlined above provide several new directions and questions for pacing 
research, and an opportunity to more effectively explore the multidimensional 
characteristics of pacing. Conceptually it can accommodate the idea that pacing 
behavior and associated muscle recruitment can arise out of both intuitive and 
deliberative cognitive processes. This is useful because research can focus on 
understanding how particular tasks, situations and triggers create the conditions under 
which intuitive and deliberative processes are more likely, when certain heuristics are 
selected in preference to others, and how they influence or bias pacing decisions. For 
example, it might be hypothesized that pre-planned pacing strategies that are 
consciously formulated by athlete and coach well in advance of the race are 
deliberative, and follow a systematic control strategy based on the execution of pre-
planned algorithms.  Equally it could be hypothesized that intuitive decision-making 
processes are better in situations during the race, where there are complex, incomplete 
or conflicting cues and a high degree of outcome uncertainty. Intuitive processes may 
also provide an important means by which athletes can make rapid pacing decisions 
perhaps in response to sudden and unexpected competitor behavior. 
Future research could focus on identifying and understanding the heuristic principles 
that athletes rely on to make intuitive pacing decisions in complex situations that are 
otherwise difficult to resolve through deliberation. But we also need to develop a better 
understanding of how heuristic decision-making can in some circumstances lead to 
outstanding performance yet failure in other instances. Overall, greater insight about 
how heuristics and biases affect pacing and performance could help develop methods 
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to improve intuitive decision-making skills in athletes to help them effectively adapt and 
respond to novel or difficult situations.  
While in some situations intuitive decision-making capacity is useful, other 
circumstances lend themselves to deliberative processes. To illustrate this point, 
Kahneman & Tversky analogized, “…making decisions is like speaking prose – people 
do it all the time, knowingly or unknowingly.” (p.341) [45]. In pacing research we must 
gain a clearer understanding of i) the situational conditions for which deliberative 
processes are most advantageous and ii) the hidden pre-decisional cognitive processes 
through which deliberation proceeds. The first point is important because it will help 
break the impasse in pacing research associated with the issue of conscious versus 
subconscious control. The second point is important because what should emerge from 
such understanding is the development of conscious attention, perceptual and problem-
solving strategies that athletes can use to improve pacing decisions. In the pacing 
literature a great deal of emphasis is placed on the importance of anticipation [3,5-8] yet 
very little has been done to understand the cognitive processes involved in anticipating 
the demands of a future task, or how such appraisals influence subsequent pacing 
decisions. The ability to anticipate involves hypothetical thinking [80] and prospective 
mental simulation [81]. For prospective thought to accurately predict events two 
essential conditions must be met: i) the context we are in or imagine we are in during 
simulation does not vastly deviate from the actual future context that transpires and ii) 
the memories used to simulate are sufficiently vivid and realistic representations of the 
future event [81]. In the context of athletic pacing, especially during the early stages of 
an endurance event, the likelihood of inaccurate mental simulation is high owing to the 
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potential for internal or external conditions to change that could result in pacing errors 
and negative effects on overall performance. A further complication is the influence that 
opponents in ‘real world’ athletic competitions might have on athletic decision-making 
and tactics [75,76] for which circumstance, intuition and hypothetical thinking may play a 
crucial role. A fuller understanding of deliberative cognitive processes will help develop 
conscious decision-making skills for athletes. 
There are many practical issues that need to be considered to operationalize dual-
process athletic pacing research. The first is to recognize the limitations of time series 
measurements of speed and power which, although useful indicators of post-decisional 
pacing behaviour, reveal very little about pre-decisional cognitive processes whether 
intuitive or deliberative. The issue is further complicated by the fact that many of the 
predecisional cognitive processes are hidden and not directly observable so a special 
category of research techniques known as process-tracing is needed. These and other 
operational research issues are discussed more comprehensively in the Electronic 
Supplementary Material Appendix S1, along with an introduction to process tracing 
methods and their application to dual-process athletic pacing research.  
7. Conclusions 
The one-dimensional conscious-subconscious debate that has reigned in the pacing 
literature has suppressed our understanding of the multidimensional processes that 
occur in pacing decisions. If we limit ourselves to only one facet of the multidimensional 
process of pacing, the conscious-subconscious debate, other exciting and useful areas 
of exploring human behaviour in a sports context will remain relatively unattended. We 
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need to explore how and based on which information athletes make their decisions 
using smartly designed experiments that incorporate eg athlete-environment 
interactions. It is our contention that conceptualizing decision making in pacing as 
involving intuitive or deliberative process provides a means by which further research 
progress can be made on parallel problems without being constrained by the singular 
issue of conscious versus subconscious control. In addition to the opportunities for 
exploring the multidimensional character of pacing, such an approach reflects the 
complex nature of athletic decision-making. 
In attempting to refine pacing models and improve training strategies and psychological 
skills for athletes, the dual-process framework could be used to gain a clearer 
understanding of i) the situational conditions for which either intuitive or deliberative 
decisions are optimal, ii) how intuitive and deliberative decisions are biased by 
perception, emotion and experience, and iii) the underlying cognitive mechanisms such 
as memory, attention allocation, problem-solving and hypothetical thought. 
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Legends 
Figure 1. In previous pacing models the conscious and subconscious mind are 
conceptualised as distinct (conscious ⊄ subconscious) with no adequate definition or 
distinction of subconscious or unconscious being made (Figure 1a). In contrast the 
topographical model emphasises a psychodynamic relationship whereby conscious ⊂ 
subconscious ⊂ unconscious (Figure 1b). Thus all thoughts, perceptions and decisions 
that are experienced in conscious awareness have unconscious foundations. By 
redirecting attentional focus an individual can become aware of subconscious content 
[25].
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1. Introduction 
In the linked main article, philosophical considerations of how dual process theory might 
contribute to a developing understanding of pacing mechanisms are discussed. What is 
missing, and what will be the focus of this Electronic Supplementary Material, is 
important practical issues that we hope will help operationalize this kind of research. We 
propose that pacing research can be categorized according to three dimensions that 
broadly represent its descriptive, prescriptive and explanatory objectives, 
acknowledging that some studies span the dimensions. The constraints of existing 
methods in pacing research will be discussed in the context of dual-process decision-
making and then an overview of particular approaches and methodologies will be given. 
This Electronic Supplementary Material is not intended to give detailed guidance on 
each method but rather provide a rudimentary introduction to a variety of process-
tracing techniques that have particular utility in investigating dual-processes during self-
paced exercise. Readers interested in using certain techniques are encouraged to refer 
to the corresponding key literature for more detailed methodological guidance which we 
have included under each section.  
2. Dimensions of Pacing Research 
Pacing research can be broadly categorized as being descriptive, prescriptive or 
explanatory. Descriptive pacing research, aims to measure changes in speed or power 
output during athletic tasks that vary in type, duration or distance. Descriptive pacing 
research involves the observation and measurement of pacing outcomes and there is 
no manipulation of variables. It was the evidence amassed from descriptive research, 
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whereby particular patterns of changing speed or power where found to correspond with 
events of certain durations, from which the taxonomy of pacing strategies has emerged. 
This research is reviewed elsewhere [1] but summarily it has been found all-out and 
positive pacing strategies are mostly used that short duration events, whereas even, 
negative or U-shaped pacing strategies are used in longer duration events. An 
extension of this type of research has been to describe the biomechanical, 
physiological, psychological and overall performance consequences of various pacing 
strategies, again also reviewed more comprehensively elsewhere [1,2]. 
The purpose of prescriptive pacing research is to identify pacing strategies that are 
optimal for, i) events of a certain type, duration or objective, ii) particular environmental 
or situational conditions and, iii) athletes of a particular group, category, standard or 
level of fitness. Prescriptive pacing research goes beyond observing and describing 
pacing patterns by attempting to investigate which pacing strategy produces the most 
favourable performance with respect to either completion time or finishing position. 
Prescriptive pacing research is usually driven by a desire to identify optimal pacing 
strategies, often with coaching practice or other forms applied athlete support in mind. 
There are three main approaches to prescriptive pacing research. The first, which we 
recognize overlaps with the descriptive dimension, involves observing and describing 
the pacing strategies of elite or expert performers, the findings of which are then used to 
approximate optimal pacing strategy. While good examples of this kind of research exist 
[3-6], it should not be assumed that the strategies adopted by elite performers are 
generalizable to all groups of athletes or all situations. A second, between-subjects 
approach, has been to compare the pacing strategies of different groups of athletes, for 
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instance by gender [7-9], successfulness [9-11] or experience [12,13]. The third 
approach to prescriptive pacing research uses a within-subjects approach whereby the 
impact of different pacing strategies is tested by repeating a performance with either all 
or part of the pacing strategy manipulated [14,15].  
Explanatory pacing research is more concerned with understanding underlying 
mechanisms, either intrinsic or extrinsic, that lead to particular pacing behaviours. 
Developing a better understanding of pacing mechanisms should provide a basis for 
new prescriptive pacing studies designed to further our knowledge of what constitutes 
optimal pacing.  The approach typically adopted with this type of research is to examine 
the effect that manipulating certain variables has upon pacing strategy and 
performance, thus using inductive methods to isolate, observe and make conclusions 
about the causes of pacing. Investigations of this kind have revealed a plethora of 
variables that influence pacing strategy that can be categorized as physiological [83], 
neurophysiological [16], psychological [17-19] and environmental [20,21]. Deception 
methods have been particularly prevalent in researching the role of performance 
feedback on pacing behavior [22,23], especially given the prominence some theories 
have placed on awareness of the endpoint [24-32]. Decision-making has been recently 
highlighted as an important mechanism of pacing behavior [33,34] and this relatively 
new perspective on pacing clearly falls under the explanatory dimension of pacing 
research. Understanding how pacing decisions are made will require new and 
sophisticated approaches to pacing research. 
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3. Limitations and Opportunities of Current Approaches to Pacing Research 
Before overviewing particular methodologies, it is first necessary to discuss ways in 
which existing approaches to measuring pace limit the inferences that can be made 
about associated judgment and decision-making processes. The example pacing traces 
given in Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1 represent changes in speed 
measured during a 10 mile (16.1 km) cycling time trial by a novice time-trial cyclist. In 
Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1a, speed has been averaged across 25% 
(4 km) segments from which a parabolic reverse J-shaped pacing pattern is evident. 
Segmenting pacing data in this way is commonplace in the pacing literature and can 
vary from as much as 5% segment averaging [19] to as little as 25% averaging [12]. 
Segment averaging is a helpful way of presenting and analyzing pace because it 
provides a way to identify pacing patterns from otherwise noisy and confusing data. 
Nevertheless, there are some explanatory limitations associated with segment 
averaging since it fails to adequately represent and potentially misrepresents 
momentary pacing behavior and underlying decision-making processes that have led to 
that behavior. For instance, in Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1a it could be 
concluded that the cyclists chose a fast start during the first 25% of the time-trial, 
adopted a negative (falling) pace during the middle sections and then increased pace 
during the last 25% of the event. However Electronic Supplementary Material Figure 
S1b, which presents the raw data for the same trial sampled at 5 hz, reveals much more 
stochastic and complex changes in pace. With such frequent and sometimes erratic 
changes in pace it seems obvious that segmentation is unlikely to reveal anything useful 
about moment-to-moment decision-making processes, especially since it is unlikely that 
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athletes’ strategic deliberations correspond with the particular segment sizes specified 
by the researcher. Put another way, researcher-defined segments do not necessarily 
correspond with the cognitive representations of time or distance that athletes actually 
use in making pacing decisions. 
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Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1. Example pacing pattern of a 10 mile (16.1 km) 
cycling time trial with 4 km segment averaging (a) and continuous data with simple exponential 
smoothing (b). 
 
It would be useful to develop a way of analyzing raw pacing data such that particular 
moments can be identified where pace has changed and corresponding decisions have 
been made. This is an important but difficult problem because: i) it is difficult to define 
what constitutes a strategically meaningful change and to differentiate between those 
changes that are a consequence of mechanical fluctuations rather than intuitive or 
deliberative decisions; ii) it is difficult to precisely identify when such a change in pace 
has occurred which is important to investigate decision processes that precede it either 
immediately or after a short delay; and iii) decisions not to change pace are effectively 
invisible in a pacing trace and can only be revealed by triangulating continuous pacing 
data with other information. These problems are best exemplified by considering the 
grey area highlighted in Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1b which shows an 
apparent drop in speed which occurs somewhere between 4.6 to 5 km and then an 
increase in speed between 5 km onwards. Closer inspection of the exploded section 
(inset) highlights the difficulty of pinpointing the exact moment the drop in pace was 
initiated because the numerous data points that occur in the proximity of the peak. 
While a variety of smoothing methods like moving averages or more sophisticated 
exponential smoothing (as displayed in Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1b) 
can be applied, all such methods produce lag between the raw and smoothed data (see 
inset section of Electronic Supplementary Material Figure S1b) and therefore are not 
helpful in determining precise moments of change. Furthermore, it seems impossible to 
determine from raw data whether changes in pace were intuitive or deliberate, if there 
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was any delay (latency) between when a decision was made and implemented, and 
whether the magnitude of change in speed was strategically meaningful. In this sense, 
even continuous measurements of pace similar to that presented in Electronic 
Supplementary Material Figure S1b, have limited utility when presented alone in 
understanding decision-making processes. It is crucial that pacing data, whether 
presented as speed, power or some other measurement, is treated and interpreted as a 
behavioural outcome of pacing decisions and not as a surrogate measure of the 
decision-making processes themselves. While the pacing trace can provide useful 
information about the implementation of pacing decisions, it does not reveal anything 
about the hidden dual processes of judgment and decision-making for which additional 
measurements are needed and are discussed in section 4. 
4. Methodological Approaches to Dual Processes and Decision Making in Athletic 
Pacing Research 
At this point it is helpful to make a hypothetical distinction between two ways through 
which pacing decisions might proceed. The first is where an athlete continually monitors 
and interprets important cues while performing a task and makes a decision to maintain, 
increase or decrease their pace that they might implement across varying timescales. 
The second is where an athlete might make and implement an instantaneous pacing 
decision perhaps as a reaction to an expected or unexpected event such as a sudden 
change in terrain, environmental conditions, competitor behavior or their own 
physiological condition. In both such situations the decision-making process typically 
involve a number of common processes including the acquisition of information, the 
integration and interpretation of information, and decision implementation. The 
ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT 
39 
 
adequacy of the pacing trace in measuring the implementation of pacing decisions has 
already been discussed in section 3. The remainder of this section will outline methods 
that can be used to investigate information acquisition, integration and interpretation. 
Because these research techniques are concerned with investigating cognitive 
processes, either intuitive or deliberative, they are sometimes collectively referred to as 
process tracing methods. Process tracing methods are intended to reveal pre-decision 
behaviours and cognitive processes that lead to a decision [35] whereas, as previously 
discussed, measurements of speed and power represent post-decision pacing 
behaviour.  
4.1 Information Acquisition Research Methods    
In trying to establish which type of information is most important to athletes, a typical 
approach has been to manipulate selected information using blinding or deception 
methods [22,23]. The purpose of such studies is to evaluate the dependency upon, and 
importance of, certain types of information in the regulation of pace. The rationale is 
that, if, after altering or removing a particular source of information pacing or 
performance changes, it can be inferred that, that information source has an important 
contributory role. It is evidence from these studies that have led to pacing models where 
awareness of progress towards the endpoint, either by distance or time, have come to 
be so dominant [24-32]. These experiments have provided a useful way of investigating 
the influence of certain information on pacing behavior but such methods are not 
without their limitations. One is that, in designing these experiments, it is necessary to 
make prior assumptions about which informational variables to manipulate. While this 
has application in testing theories where the importance of certain information such as 
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the endpoint is specified, it is less useful in constructing pacing theory and discovering 
which information athletes actually seek out and use during self-paced exercise. It also 
assumes that all individuals commonly use the same information cues to make pacing 
decisions, therefore missing opportunities to understand individual adaptive variations in 
information preference, acquisition and interpretation. Active information search and eye 
fixation measurements are process-tracing methods provide an alternative to deception 
and blinding studies to investigate information acquisition processes. 
4.1.1 Active Information Search 
A question of great importance to understanding pacing behavior is what information 
athletes seek to make pacing decisions? One method that can help progress this 
question is active information search (AIS) yet, for a variety of reasons and to our 
knowledge, it has never been used in pacing research. During the performance of a 
task, AIS can be used to identify what information participants use, what information 
they ignore, and the sequence of information they refer to while solving problems [36]. 
There are several phases to the AIS procedure. During the first phase, participants are 
presented with information about a scenario that requires a decision and several 
choices. During the next phase participants are permitted to ask questions to which they 
receive a standardized pre-prepared answer usually given through an answer card or 
computer display. Participants are permitted to ask as many questions as they feel 
necessary, and may repeat questions if they like before entering the final phase of AIS 
which involves making a choice. A more comprehensive review of the AIS method and 
its variations is available elsewhere [37]. 
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The advantage of AIS is that it allows researchers not only to measure what information 
participants think they need in order to make a decision about a given problem, but also 
the sequence in which they refer to, or go back to, information. It must be emphasized 
that it does not reveal anything about whether such information was actually used in 
making the decision, which is why we have introduced it as an information acquisition 
research method. The AIS method has investigative potential in understanding 
deliberative decision-making processes but there are challenges to overcome for its use 
in athletic pacing research. One challenge relates to using AIS during exercise. 
Traditionally, participants carry out an AIS task in a laboratory in non-exercising 
conditions where they have time to read a scenario and then request more information 
before making a decision. The timing and sequence to information requests is either 
logged automatically using software such as WebDip [38] or recorded manually. The 
conventional AIS method is therefore difficult to carry out while participants are 
exercising and therefore would need modifying for pacing studies. 
One adaptation might be to develop exercise related AIS scenarios that, although 
athletes would complete during non-exercising conditions, would still require them to 
make a decision about whether to increase, decrease or maintain pace. In order to 
achieve this, it would be necessary to pre-prepare responses to likely questions that the 
athlete participant might ask and the procedure for doing this is described in more detail 
elsewhere [37]. In this version of AIS participants would not be completing a self-paced 
task but we would nevertheless argue that such methods are still helpful in 
understanding the information acquisition processes athletes undergo before arriving at 
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a pacing decision. The ecological validity of AIS could perhaps be improved by asking 
participants to complete the task in various states of exertion or fatigue. 
The second is to develop self-paced exercise scenarios where all the usual feedback 
information is withheld from participants and only made available to them upon an 
explicit request. At the most basic level this could involve hiding performance 
information such as time or speed which participants could reveal by operating a control 
of some kind. In more complex scenarios participants might have the opportunity to ask 
for more information about the environment, weather, competitors, probabilities and 
other factors. 
While there are challenges associated with the AIS method in pacing research, it does 
have potential in developing a better understanding of what information athletes think 
they need to make key pacing decisions. In being able to measure the order in which 
certain information is requested, the AIS method can reveal more about deliberative 
decision making-processes and the corresponding information needs of athletes.     
4.1.2 Eye Fixations 
Of all the senses, vision is the superordinate means through which individuals acquire 
information about their immediate environment. As such measuring what athletes look 
at during the performance of certain tasks has huge potential in revealing information 
acquisition patterns, unconstrained by the previously discussed assumptions and biases 
of information-manipulation studies. Measuring eye-movements is relatively easy and a 
variety of methods are available which are comprehensively reviewed elsewhere [39]. 
Eye-tracking technology has improved significantly during the past decade, particularly 
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mobile eye-tracking devices which are clearly very useful for both laboratory and field-
based pacing studies. There are a variety of ways in which eye-trackers work, the most 
common of which involves monitoring and recording corneal reflection. An eye-tracker 
typically consists of a forward-looking scene camera and a second camera that records 
the eye. Modern eye-trackers have the capability to make high-definition recordings and 
have advanced from having monocular to binocular tracking functions that provide 
enhanced sensitivity and better resolution of eye movement measurements. All eye-
trackers require calibrating for each individual participant. For some individuals the 
devices can be difficult or impossible to calibrate meaning that some participants are 
excluded from the sample. Another practical issue of using eye-trackers during exercise 
is the added likelihood that sudden head movements or perspiration droplets obscuring 
the eye camera can knock-out the calibration during a capture period. While these 
issues can be minimized, using eye-trackers during exercise requires skill and patience 
to ensure that reliable, high-quality data is collected and this should be accommodated 
during the pilot phase of any study. 
Eye-tracking involves measuring saccadic eye movements. Saccades are a particular 
category of eye movements that involve quick jumps from fixating on one object to 
another. Saccadic eye movements can be easily observed without any equipment by 
looking at the eyes of another person while they are reading. Saccades while scanning 
a scene typically involve about 6° movements and can be a fast as 700°.s-1 [40]. The 
ability to measure eye fixations and saccadic eye movements is a very reliable way of 
directly determining information acquisition processes which, during self-paced exercise 
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studies, has the potential to reveal what environmental or informational cues 
participants consider to be important. 
The cues that participants look at are commonly referred to as objects of regard. Two 
particular measurements can be used to indicate the relative importance placed upon 
particular objects which are fixation time [41] and fixation frequency [42]. Fixation times 
can be calculated in several ways. Total accumulated time that an object of regard is 
looked at is considered to be a measure of importance [41]. Average fixation time is 
considered to represent cognitive processing effort and has been used to differentiate 
between intuitive (fast) and deliberative (slow) thinking [43]. In a recent study, at this 
time published as a conference abstract, average fixation time was used to show that 
expert cyclists primarily looked at speed during a 10 mile time-trial whereas novices 
primarily looked at elapsed distance [44]. Eye fixation sequences, or the order in which 
participants look at or switch between objects of regard, are also a useful measure of 
information acquisition. During self-paced exercise this could be useful in understanding 
how athletes find or select important cues during complex or novel situations. It could 
also be useful in revealing what information athletes use when faced with a situation 
that requires them to make a choice between a number of alternative possibilities. For 
example, whether to pursue an attacking competitor or hold back.   
4.2 Information Integration and Interpretation Methods 
While eye tracking can measure information acquisition, it is nevertheless limited in that 
it does not reveal anything about what participants think. For example, in one eye-
tracking study expert time-trial cyclists where found to look at speed for longer [44] and 
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it would be tempting to conclude that they value feedback about speed more than 
distance. However, it may just be that the processing of distance information is quick 
and required less cognitive effort whereas, in regulating their performance, they 
required more continual monitoring of speed and more in depth processing of this type 
of feedback. In order to understand how athletes are using the information they attend 
to, other process tracing methods are needed which can either be used in isolation or in 
conjunction with other methods such as eye-tracking. This section will focus on verbal 
protocols and response times. 
4.2.1 Concurrent Verbal Protocols 
Concurrent verbal protocol is a process-tracing method that involves participants 
verbalizing their thoughts aloud while they are carrying out a task [45]. Thoughts that 
are spoken aloud contemporaneously with a task have been put forward as a reliable 
way of understanding actual thinking [46] because it reflects short term memory 
processing and internal deliberation [47,48]. Acknowledging the complex relationship 
between language and thought [49], thinking aloud can provide important subjective 
data about deliberative decision-making processes during self-paced exercise. While a 
reasonable body of literature exists regarding the closely related subject of self-talk 
during physical activity [50-54], it is important to recognize that self-talk is not a process-
tracing technique but rather a psychological skill that athletes sometime used to 
overcome anxiety, negative thoughts or other mental stressors. 
Concurrent verbal protocols can take many different forms but our focus will be on the 
version put forward by Ericsson and Simon [47] which is considered to be the gold 
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standard. Their standard comprises four important phases involving participant 
instructions, participant familiarization, data recording and data analysis. Participants 
are first given written instructions to read, which should ask them to say their thoughts 
aloud during a task. The instructions should emphasize the importance of saying 
everything they are thinking and to talk continuously throughout the task without pause. 
Participants should be then familiarized with thinking aloud by allowing them to practice 
while completing a simple problem, perhaps involving basic arithmetic or choosing 
which painting they prefer from two alternatives. During the familiarization phase 
participants may have to be reminded to simply verbalize what they are thinking rather 
than to explain their thoughts. Only once a participant develops competence in thinking 
aloud should an attempt to collect experimental data proper commence. During the data 
collection phase both the participant’s verbalizations and their actions relating to the 
task should be recorded. The researcher should aim for minimum interference and 
interaction, but should remind a participant to keep talking should they stop doing so for 
more than 5 seconds. Analyzing the data usually involves segmenting the transcribed 
verbal recordings into blocks and coding the content which is then used to identify either 
component processes of decisions, sequences of processes or complete models [55]. 
The approach to analyzing verbal protocol data varies considerably [56] although a 
helpful framework for identifying decision-making processes from verbal data does exist 
[57].  
Think aloud data does have great potential in determining whether intuitive or 
deliberative thought processes produce better pacing decisions. This is possible by 
comparing the effectiveness of a solution to a problem a participant first mentions 
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(intuition) against the effectiveness of the eventual solution that they carry out 
(deliberation), an approach which has be used to investigate decision-making during 
chess [58]. However, while it is easy to quantify the strength of a chess move, it is more 
difficult to quantify the strength of a pacing decision and if such approaches are to be 
adopted then protocols will need to be developed where pacing decisions can pin-
pointed in time, measured and evaluated for effectiveness. 
Concurrent verbal protocols do have their limitations, in particular the significant threats 
to their reliability and validity. Two particular forms of invalidity have been associated 
with concurrent verbal protocols [59] which are reactivity, where a participant’s attention 
to verbalizing their thoughts interferes with their decision-making processes, and non-
veridicality, where participants either omit some of the decision-making processes or 
misrepresent such processes. The issue of reactivity can be addressed by including a 
control condition in which participants are not required to think aloud, nevertheless in 
pacing research participants’ ability to verbalize will be significantly hampered by the 
high-intensity nature of most studies. It is possible to collect concurrent verbal data 
during high-intensity exercise but the technique will require practice and researchers 
should also carefully consider whether the potential effects verbalization itself has on 
energetics and performance is a compromise worth making. Non-veridicality can be 
minimized by ensuring participants clearly understand the instructions and have 
sufficient opportunity to become competent in thinking aloud during the familiarization 
phase. Ericsson and Simon further argued that think aloud data must satisfy several 
conditions including being relevant to the task in hand rather than some unrelated issue, 
and to be logically consistent with the immediately preceding verbalization. 
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4.2.2 Retrospective Verbal Protocols 
An advantage that retrospective verbal protocols have over concurrent verbal protocols 
is that reactivity threats can be eliminated, providing participants are not made aware 
that they will be asked about their decisions retrospectively. However, different threats 
to validity are introduced the most notable of which is associated with errors in memory 
recall such as distortion, omission and construction effects [59]. One of the known 
problems of asking participants after an event why they made a decision is the tendency 
to infer a reason rather than trying to remember their actual thought processes [60]. 
This is a significant threat to the validity of post-decision surveys and interviews, 
although this can be minimized by carefully briefing participants beforehand. 
There are two main methods for gathering retrospective verbal reports. The first 
involves a traditional interview which can vary from being unstructured to fully structured 
during which participants are asked to explain, describe or rate decision-making 
processes. The second, known as a cued retrospective verbal reporting, involves 
simulated recall in which participants are asked to discuss their decision-making 
processes while watching replayed video footage of themselves performing a problem 
or task [61]. 
Retrospective verbal reports are advantageous in pacing research because they avoid 
reactivity, particularly the likelihood that concurrent verbalization will interfere with the 
performance of the exercise task and vice-versa. However, unlike concurrent reports, 
retrospective reporting lacks spontaneity and therefore has a diminished ability to 
differentiate between intuitive and deliberative pacing decisions. Both concurrent and 
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retrospective verbal protocols are, by their nature, also limited to conscious processes 
except when pre-conscious, subconscious or unconscious processes temporarily move 
into consciousness. Verbal protocol methods represent a powerful way of gathering and 
analyzing subjective decision-making data in dual process pacing research providing 
such studies are carefully designed and deployed with rigour.   
 
4.2.3 Response Times and Systems Factorial Technology Methods 
According to dual process theory, intuitive decision-making is quick and depends mostly 
on parallel processing of information whereas deliberative decision-making is slower 
owing to the serial processing of information. Another dimension of cognitive processing 
relevant to decision-making is whether all possible cues are considered before a 
decision is made (exhaustive processing), or whether processing stops once an 
acceptable decision is arrived at (self-terminating processing). In simple decision-
making tasks, where participants are to make a choice based upon two input cues, 
response time between the presentation of the cues and the decision can potentially 
differentiate serial from parallel processing. Athletic pacing decisions, however, are 
usually made in complex environments with many cues. This creates a problem 
because parallel processing slows down as a function of the number of cues and thus 
response time has a diminished capability to discriminate serial from parallel processes, 
an effect known as the model mimicking dilemma [62]. 
An elegant way of resolving response time ambiguity between serial and parallel 
processes is found in a non-parametric statistical technique known as systems factorial 
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technology (SFT) for which more detailed guidance can be found in Harding et al. [63]. 
The fundamental principle of SFT is that when input cues subject to hidden cognitive 
processes are selectively manipulated, it is possible from the resultant response time 
patterns to determine whether those hidden cognitive process are serial exhaustive, 
serial self-terminating, parallel exhaustive, parallel self-terminating, or co-acting. 
To illustrate the principles of SFT in a pacing context, imagine a situation where one 
cyclist (A) was in head-to-head situation with another competitor cyclist (B) who 
suddenly accelerates into a sprint. Cyclist A is forced to make a decision whether to 
follow the breakaway cyclist B and suppose we hypothesize in that making such a 
decision they need to consider two crucial pieces of information; distance remaining and 
perceived exertion. While we could measure how long it takes cyclist A to make a 
decision (the response time between cyclist B accelerating and cyclist A acting), it 
would be impossible from response time alone to determine whether the information 
cues of distance and perceived exertion were processed in parallel or serial to arrive at 
such a decision. If, for whatever reason, an erosion in the quality or availability of one or 
both information sources (distance or perceived exertion) occurred, it would be 
reasonable to expect that this would disrupt whatever hidden serial or parallel 
processes are taking place and that this would cause a change to the overall decision 
time. It is this principle that SFT takes advantage of systematically manipulating input 
cues to create four conditions which, in the example provided, would involve: i) distance 
corrupt, perceived exertion complete; ii) distance complete, perceived exertion corrupt; 
iii) both distance and perceived exertion corrupt and iv) both distance and perceived 
exertion complete. Each permutation selectively influences each input cue thus 
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provoking different effects on overall decision time and the basis upon which to 
differentiate between the five types of hidden cognitive processes. 
The example given above is a necessary simplification that we have used for illustration 
purposes. Nevertheless, SFT is a powerful method of uncovering hidden cognitive 
processes but several important points of detail need to be understood if it is to be of 
use in dual-process pacing research. The first is that SFT actually uses the survival 
function of response times rather than mean response times. Survivor functions can be 
easily calculated using statistical software and details of the underlying methods are 
elsewhere for the interested reader [64]. The second is that, when plotted, it is the 
shape of the survivor function can distinguish between serial self-terminating, serial 
exhaustive, parallel self-terminating, parallel exhaustive and coating hidden cognitive 
processes. The final point is that applying SFT to pacing research requires considerable 
care in experimental design. This means ensuring that adequate selective influence of 
input cues is achieved such that it is possible to independently influence one cue 
without affecting the other. It also means that in complex environments where there are 
multiple cues, complex Latin square designs will be necessary and consideration needs 
to be given as to whether such studies can be adequately powered. Also that, unlike 
much of the previous pacing literature, SFT design demands a pacing decision protocol 
to be developed whereby overall response (decision) time can be accurately measured. 
4.3 Other Process Tracing Methods Relevant to Pacing Research  
So far the main process-tracing methods for investigating information acquisition and 
information processing have been discussed. There is another category of process 
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tracing methods concerned with measuring psychophysiological correlates of decision-
making that this section will briefly introduce. During the past few decades, methods 
and techniques to measure or image brain activity have become economically viable 
and much more accessible to researchers around the world which has provided exciting 
alternatives to some of the traditional process-tracing methods already discussed. 
Some of the key physiological and neurological measures include, but are not restricted 
to, pupil dilation, galvanic skin response (GSR) and imaging techniques of localization 
such as near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), electroencephalography (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). These measurements can often indicate 
psychophysiological changes that correspond with cognitive and information 
processing. Compared to some of the behavioural process-tracing methods already 
discussed, they tend to depend less on subjective data like verbal information and very 
often respond to processes that span all degrees of consciousness. Nevertheless, care 
must be taken to ensure that such measurements are interpreted in a meaningful and 
appropriate way because, while they do change concomitantly with cognitive processes, 
there are also many other non-cognitive factors that can provoke such changes 
especially during exercise. Isolating the information–processing stimulation of neural or 
physiological factors clearly presents experimental challenges for athletic pacing 
research. That is not to dismiss such methods but rather to highlight their investigative 
boundaries as process-tracing methods.  
Galvanic skin response (GSR) can be used to indicate activation of the sympathetic 
nervous system by measuring changes in electrodermal activity related to eccrine 
sweating and a fuller review is available elsewhere [65]. Since many factors, especially 
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those related to exercise, can provoke changes in GSR care would be needed to use it 
for dual-process pacing research. However, GSR is a useful indicator of the emotional 
dimension of decision-making [66] and therefore has the potential to investigate the role 
of the affect heuristic in both deliberative and intuitive pacing decisions. 
In addition to saccadic eye movements, it is also possible to measure pupil dilation 
using most eye-tracking devices [67]. Pupil dilation measurement methods, or 
pupillometry, records changes in eye pupil diameter. In addition to responding to light, 
pupil dilation changes can be used in light controlled conditions to indicate emotional 
and cognitive processes [68]. Perhaps of particular relevance to dual process pacing 
research is the most remarkable recent findings that pupil responses can reveal 
cognitive processing that occurs below the conscious threshold as indicated in studies 
involving blindsight patients [69] and amnesic patients [68]. Thus it may be possible, in 
carefully controlled conditions, to use pupillometry to investigate unconscious, 
subconscious or preconscious mechanisms involved in intuitive pacing decisions. 
The final collection of techniques we wish to introduce are brain localization methods 
which can be passive, such as NIRS, EEG and fMRI, or active, such as transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). With 
passive methods it is possible to gain a better understanding of the neural basis of 
decision making and, when integrated with behavioural observations, presents a 
powerful opportunity to test the neurological plausibility of decision-making models [70]. 
In the context of dual-process pacing research it may, at a fundamental level, be able to 
test whether behavioural observations of deliberative decision-making correspond with 
neural activation of brain regions known to have executive control functions. For 
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example, value-based decisions have been associated with prefrontal cortex activation 
[71] and the parietal cortex [72]. Emotional influences on decisions have been 
associated with the anterior insular [73] and amygdala [74]. There are a number of 
barriers to adopting such approaches in dual-process pacing research such as 
difficulties of reducing movement artefacts during vigourous exercise and compatibility 
issues between the strong magnets used with fMRI and exercise equipment. 
Another limitation of passive imaging methods is that it is impossible to establish 
causality between neural states and decisions however this is possible with active brain 
stimulation methods like TMS and tDCS. With TMS an electromagnetic current of 
approximately 1.5 to 2 tesla is passed across the scalp and skull using a coil to 
stimulate cortical brain regions [75], whereas tDCS applies a low direct current via an 
anode to depolarize and excite neuronal activity or hyperpolarize via a cathode to 
decrease neuronal excitability [76]. The use of TMS and tDCS to disrupt particular 
cortical regions of the brain and then measure decision-making behaviour means that it 
is possible to establish causal relationships [77]. For example, stimulation of the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been found to cause riskier behaviour during a 
gambling task [78] and it maybe that similar techniques could be applied research to 
test previously reported effects between risk-taking and athletic pacing [12]. As non-
invasive brain stimulation techniques, TMS and tDCS have great potential in 
understanding dual process thinking in athletic pacing. 
5. Conclusions 
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In attempting to understand dual process thinking and decision making in athletic 
pacing, behavioural observations of changes in pace are somewhat limited. A key 
limitation is that they only inform us about the outcomes of a pacing decision, and even 
then do not reveal anything about decisions not to change pace which are of course 
invisible. In order to understand the information processing that results in a decision, 
special tracing methods are needed that can help uncover these otherwise hidden 
cognitive mechanisms. Collectively these methods are referred to as process tracing 
and can be broadly categorized as those designed to understand information acquisition 
processes, information integration processes and neurological correlates of decision-
making. There are significant methodological challenges of deploying process-tracing 
methods to athletic pacing research owing to validity and reliability threats such as 
those caused by vigorous movement, interference with pacing behaviour or individual 
differences. Nevertheless, process tracing methods have great investigative potential 
and, with careful integration and research design, will help advance our understanding 
of how pacing decisions are made and executed.    
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